Benjamin Franklin said, “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Bigger Pie Forum says, “Billions of prevention is worth trillions of cure.”
Franklin was talking about preventing fires. We’re talking about preventing floods. Rain causes floods. A clogged Mississippi River makes them longer and higher. Mudberg clogs the river. It’s a mound of sediments (sand and mud) below the Old River Control Complex (ORCC) upstream of Baton Rouge.
The US Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) is in charge of flood control. It predicts that a major flood will overtop mainline levees — and trigger a disaster like the 1927 flood for landowners on both sides of the river.
LSU scientist Dr. Yi-Jun Xu says it’s just a matter of time before a big flood makes the Mississippi change course down the Atchafalaya River. That will be an unprecedented disaster for New Orleans, the Port of South Louisiana (largest in the Western Hemisphere), the petrochemical corridor (about 25% of U.S. capacity), critical infrastructure (LNG terminals, crude export facilities, pipeline and transmission line and transportation corridors that serve the entire continental interior, and barge facilities and grain terminals that support the entire Midwest agricultural export chain.)
These interests have not connected Mudberg’s threat to their existence. But landowners upriver inside the levees have. They know that floods got worse — starting in 2015. That the river was above flood stage in the Natchez, Vicksburg, and Greenville reaches twice as long in the five years after 2015 as it was before — on an 8% increase in rainfall. That the 2019 flood was above flood stage 162 days at Vicksburg. That the Yazoo Basin flooded for 219 straight days. That levee seep water set records on both sides of the river.
They may not know that Baton Rouge was above flood stage 2.5 times longer in the five years after 2015 vs the prior five years — on the same 8% more rain. And that flooding is worse below ORCC than above it. So risks of course change and levees’ overtopping are greater there.
The Corps blames the 2.5 times longer floods there on 8% more rain too. But its own sedimentation studies show that it diverts only 55% of the sediments needed to keep the channel open — and leaves 7.5 million tons per year to accumulate below Old River and make Mudberg bigger every year. The Corps has not asked Congress for funding to dredge Mudberg and restore the river’s carrying capacity. Why?
Maybe because the Corps is embarrassed to reveal that it subordinated its critical flood control mission to a privately owned hydroelectric plant that produces “green” electricity. And that this caused Mudberg. Here’s what happened.
In 1954, Congress told the Corps to stop the Mississippi from gradually changing course down the Atchafalaya and discharging to the Gulf near Morgan City, LA. So the Corps built what is now called ORCC. It diverts 23% of the Mississippi’s flow to the Atchafalaya. (That was the natural diversion in 1950 when the Corps discovered that the river was changing course.) ORCC was designed to divert flows and sediments in “desirable proportions” to keep sediments from concentrating and falling out in the main channel. (That happens when part of a meandering stream like the Mississippi is diverted.)
The original ORCC design worked for 27 years. There was some sedimentation. But no Mudberg and no course change. Then in 1990, a power plant sited just upstream of ORCC came online. The Corps changed how it operated ORCC to favor the plant. And Mudberg began to form. Corps sedimentation studies confirm this.
The power plant needs flows with few sediments so as not to damage its turbines. So the Corps reduced flows to ORCC with lots of sediments to send flows with few sediments to the power plant. The result was predictable: sediments concentrated and fell out in the main channel. And Mudberg was born.
In 2017, Dr. Xu published research — using Corps measurements — that showed the riverbed had risen 30 feet and the channel had narrowed by half a mile in places. Earlier Corps studies confirmed Mudberg was growing and would keep growing until flows to the power plant stopped and flows to ORCC were restored as originally designed. This bottleneck restricts the river’s flow, makes floods take longer to drain, and makes floods near it higher.
We are currently in a drought. Rains and floods will return when it’s over. The Corps can’t stop them. But it could dredge Mudberg to pass the floods quickly to the Gulf and make floods shorter and lower. Droughts are the time to dredge.
The Corps dredges to keep a barge channel open. But not to remove Mudberg. Why? It costs about a billion to dredge the barge channel. It may cost a hundred billion to dredge Mudberg. The Corps may be reluctant to ask Congress for the money — since it caused Mudberg.
I recently testified before the Mississippi River Commission, which oversees the Corps’ flood control work, and asked some questions about this:
1. The Corps’ predictions about levees overtopping assume no growth in Mudberg. Doesn’t that understate flood risk since Mudberg is still growing?
2. Why does the Corps put the power plant’s interests ahead of its core mission of flood control?
3. Why doesn’t the Corps dredge Mudberg and restore the river’s flow capacity?
4. Why doesn’t the Corps quit sending flows to the power plant that fuels Mudberg’s growth?
5. If the Corps does dredge Mudberg and stops its growth, will that reduce the risk of course change and levee failures?
6. If it won’t — what’s Plan B?
Kelley Williams, a Northsider, is chairman of Bigger Pie, a Jackson-based think tank promoting free markets and government efficiency.
